For anyone confused, this is (very good imo) fiction about supply-chain incidents. It had me very worried during a brief scan that it was real though, which made me read it more attentively :)
It's easy to be cynical because, yes, both the problems and solutions seem dead obvious in hindsight. But for a long time (and maybe even still), a hacker creed was "move fast and break things."
It's great that there's so much momentum in fixing the glaring problems with supply chain systems like npm, but I'm concerned that we're entering a new era of security-related problems caused in large part by agentic development.
I'm not just talking about Mythos/Glasswing surfacing vulnerabilities in pretty much everything it touches; I think the way we're developing software, pulling in dependencies, and potentially losing human thought modeling of complex systems is going to lead to a lot of hacked together software and infrastructure that humans won't fully understand.
I hope in a few years we don't look back at today and wonder how we could have been so naive -- how we failed to actually plan for the long-tail of AI development in a way that doesn't solve problems by attempting to just use AI to rebuild complex systems.
He certainly popularized it (maybe coined it), but I've seen a lot of organizations and developers repeat that mantra.
Even without the specific words, look to product teams debating tradeoffs of going to market vs. waiting for better security controls. They're pushing for faster product release every time, at pretty much every org.
Supply chain incidents suck and we need to do better. Personally for rust I’m a proponent of the foundation supporting a few core crates that go under the same audit procedure as the main rust language and give funding to the project to limit supply chain vulns. I don’t think the right answer is to remove systems like crates or npm. Crate and npm are a boon for many developers.
Crates has also been making efforts to include rust sec, but in addition to the above I would like the community to shy away from many small dependencies to a few larger ones just as tokio has
Honest question. Commons, Guava, Spring, and more seem to take this approach successfully (as in, the drawbacks are outweighed by the benefits in convenience, quality, and security) in Java. Are benefits in binary size really worth that complexity?
And before someone says “just have a better standard library”, think about why that is considered a solution here. Languages with a large and capable standard library remain more secure than the supply-chain fiascos on NPM because they have a) very large communities reviewing and participating in changes and b) have extremely regulated and careful release processes. Those things aren’t likely to be possible in most small community libraries.
Yeah I’d agree that multiple crates under one project is basically the same as 1 large crate. The real problem is how many people you’re trusting and it’s all coming from the same person.
Recently I've been wondering why I really need MFA tokens for everything.
The initial thought was this is security culture but a few cocktails later and a discussion with a friend rather high up in the intelligence services in my country lead to a different conclusion, which aws indirectly:
I rely on too-much-shit from god-knows-where written by fuck-knows and a lot of what-the-hell running in some awful-cloud-shit.
Our supply chain problems are because the whole idea above. As is the fact I need to auth to a million things which I shouldn't have to.
Give me a boxed copy of Visual Basic with manuals and lock me in a fucking basement with an airgapped NT4 box until this all over please.
Customers give us heat for not shipping the latest vulpine-lz4. Their AI-based heuristic antivirus total defence solution automatically flags all software not running latest versions of everything
For anyone confused, this is (very good imo) fiction about supply-chain incidents. It had me very worried during a brief scan that it was real though, which made me read it more attentively :)
'nmp'
Node's Malicious Packages.
It's easy to be cynical because, yes, both the problems and solutions seem dead obvious in hindsight. But for a long time (and maybe even still), a hacker creed was "move fast and break things."
It's great that there's so much momentum in fixing the glaring problems with supply chain systems like npm, but I'm concerned that we're entering a new era of security-related problems caused in large part by agentic development.
I'm not just talking about Mythos/Glasswing surfacing vulnerabilities in pretty much everything it touches; I think the way we're developing software, pulling in dependencies, and potentially losing human thought modeling of complex systems is going to lead to a lot of hacked together software and infrastructure that humans won't fully understand.
I hope in a few years we don't look back at today and wonder how we could have been so naive -- how we failed to actually plan for the long-tail of AI development in a way that doesn't solve problems by attempting to just use AI to rebuild complex systems.
But the article was funny.
> But for a long time (and maybe even still), a hacker creed was "move fast and break things."
Was it? I thought Zuckerberg coined this horrible phrase.
He certainly popularized it (maybe coined it), but I've seen a lot of organizations and developers repeat that mantra.
Even without the specific words, look to product teams debating tradeoffs of going to market vs. waiting for better security controls. They're pushing for faster product release every time, at pretty much every org.
In any case, not really a hacker's creed. This has always been withinin the realm of corporations, especially Silicon Valley or adjacent.
This is the most SCP thing I've read in a while that's not actually an SCP.
Ah yes a very rare:
Supply Chain problem(SCP)
Thanks, I totally read that as secure copy despite the context
It's a reference to the SCP Wiki (https://scp-wiki.wikidot.com/)
Supply chain incidents suck and we need to do better. Personally for rust I’m a proponent of the foundation supporting a few core crates that go under the same audit procedure as the main rust language and give funding to the project to limit supply chain vulns. I don’t think the right answer is to remove systems like crates or npm. Crate and npm are a boon for many developers.
Crates has also been making efforts to include rust sec, but in addition to the above I would like the community to shy away from many small dependencies to a few larger ones just as tokio has
Many small crates published by large, trustworthy projects are fine and preferable to one large crate that "does everything".
Why?
Honest question. Commons, Guava, Spring, and more seem to take this approach successfully (as in, the drawbacks are outweighed by the benefits in convenience, quality, and security) in Java. Are benefits in binary size really worth that complexity?
And before someone says “just have a better standard library”, think about why that is considered a solution here. Languages with a large and capable standard library remain more secure than the supply-chain fiascos on NPM because they have a) very large communities reviewing and participating in changes and b) have extremely regulated and careful release processes. Those things aren’t likely to be possible in most small community libraries.
Yeah I’d agree that multiple crates under one project is basically the same as 1 large crate. The real problem is how many people you’re trusting and it’s all coming from the same person.
Move high value crates into the standard library?
This bloats the std library and forces lots more work and stress on the rust dev team. Not to mention it’ll add more churn to the std lib.
Maybe give crates a gold star if they have no external dependencies?
Please no, that’s a terrible outcome.
What else would you suggest that also does not have terrible outcomes. The situation as is, is untenable.
nah, remove NPM, nothing good comes out of that.
do we really need both npm and nmp though
honestly I thought this was the end goal of blessed.rs
Very enjoyable read, entirely too close to the mark
This would have been completely avoided if you were using bun dependency vector locking in Nix.
absolutely hilarious, made me laugh a lot. thank you for writing this, whether human or AI.
This week has been tough. Is it the begging of CVEgeddon?
Recently I've been wondering why I really need MFA tokens for everything.
The initial thought was this is security culture but a few cocktails later and a discussion with a friend rather high up in the intelligence services in my country lead to a different conclusion, which aws indirectly:
I rely on too-much-shit from god-knows-where written by fuck-knows and a lot of what-the-hell running in some awful-cloud-shit.
Our supply chain problems are because the whole idea above. As is the fact I need to auth to a million things which I shouldn't have to.
Give me a boxed copy of Visual Basic with manuals and lock me in a fucking basement with an airgapped NT4 box until this all over please.
Customers give us heat for not shipping the latest vulpine-lz4. Their AI-based heuristic antivirus total defence solution automatically flags all software not running latest versions of everything
Kindly advice
Ya, latest is a mess. I don't care about latest, I want the version with no known security flaws.