I like nix and its approach but if I'm being honest I think its also getting easier to be sloppy about dependencies and ask AI to find any dependencies that might be missing from the cleanly installed packaging metadata. There's maybe a paradox for developers in that we can try to drop structure and brute force scan first intensively enough to catch anything likely to get caught or we can ask AI to finally apply all the rigorous methods we decided were too expensive for routine software and probably have minimally more things to run with each release.
I found that reducing my "Linux" lines from ~21000 (including net-pf-16-proto-21) down to those ~3000 I might actually use (e.g. udp_tunnel) to be a fairly effective method of not having to care about each and every newly discovered memory safety hazard.
I remember my earlier days of Linux of having to compile a kernel module to read from cdrom. Seems like Linux has gone too far in the other direction of having modules that you will probably never need.
There has been so much discussion about the increase of volume in CVEs. I love that it's super apparent from looking at that graph of CVEs by year, there is a noticeable bend in the slope upward in the 2026 plot. It's not just hype, the rate of CVEs is changing faster than prior years.
Reads kind of sales-pitchy. Every day we see another actively exploited Linux LPE; have you thought about your SBOM today?
I like nix and its approach but if I'm being honest I think its also getting easier to be sloppy about dependencies and ask AI to find any dependencies that might be missing from the cleanly installed packaging metadata. There's maybe a paradox for developers in that we can try to drop structure and brute force scan first intensively enough to catch anything likely to get caught or we can ask AI to finally apply all the rigorous methods we decided were too expensive for routine software and probably have minimally more things to run with each release.
I feel we should definitely be digging way beyond the SBOM... but also wondering if the forecasting in the general ecosystem is on point or not.
I.e. is this overhyped?
Are you offering an easy fix for that "Linux" line on your SBOM?
I found that reducing my "Linux" lines from ~21000 (including net-pf-16-proto-21) down to those ~3000 I might actually use (e.g. udp_tunnel) to be a fairly effective method of not having to care about each and every newly discovered memory safety hazard.
I remember my earlier days of Linux of having to compile a kernel module to read from cdrom. Seems like Linux has gone too far in the other direction of having modules that you will probably never need.
No, I'm making an aesthetic critique of a promotional blog post, as an author of commercial technical blog posts myself.
There has been so much discussion about the increase of volume in CVEs. I love that it's super apparent from looking at that graph of CVEs by year, there is a noticeable bend in the slope upward in the 2026 plot. It's not just hype, the rate of CVEs is changing faster than prior years.
That is not the title of the article:
> Achieving CVE Remediation in an Era of Escalating Vulnerabilities