"How can a group hold a worldview so at odds with the wider culture and
not appear to be greatly conflicted by it? The answer may lie in the distinction
between particularism and universalism. An individual develops social identities
specific to the social domains, groups and roles – and accompanying subcultures
– that he or she occupies (e.g. manager, mother, parishioner, sports fan).
[...]
In the case of corruption, this myopia means that an otherwise ethically-minded
individual may forsake universalistic or dominant norms about ethical behavior
in favor of particularistic behaviors that favor his or her group at the expense of outsiders.
[...]
This tendency to always put the ingroup above all others clearly paves
the way for collective corruption."
The situation in which people exchange favors within their mutually beneficial personal networks seems to be the basic and typical way things function. It’s actually remarkable that we are able to resist this tendency and normalize fair and impartial institutions.
The author cites Arendt a fair bit, whose claim to fame was that entirely ordinary people could become voluntary instruments of atrocity.
I think the belief of ordinary people most likely to dispose them to atrocity is that of prioritizing the ingroup. Once we believe that the members of one's own family, or company, or country, carry more moral value than others, we're doomed to a descent limited only by our ability to make these world-worsening trades.
When I was a child, my dad would sometimes engage in small acts of corruption to please me or my brother. Taking somebody else's spot, telling white lies to get more than his share of a rationed good, that sort of thing. It never sat right with me. "Family first" has a very ominous ring to me.
The brain actually has specific neurological system that compartmentalise reasoning contexts in different social contexts, so we operate according to different sets of assumptions and rules of behaviour and reasoning in different kinds of situations.
The US supreme court allowed thank you gifts for politicians to not be considered bribes somehow in a 2024 ruling, I think that alone might break the US.
The particularism vs universalism distinction the paper draws is the mechanism I see play out in engineering orgs all the time. A team develops its own internal logic — "we ship fast, we don't write tests for that, we work around the architecture review" — and within the team that behavior feels rational and even virtuous. It's only corruption relative to the broader organization's stated values.
What makes it hard to fix in tech specifically is that the same behavior that looks like corruption from one angle (circumventing process) looks like execution speed from another. The person who bypasses code review to ship a hotfix is either a hero or a liability depending on who's telling the story.
The paper's point about normalization through socialization is the part that should concern anyone who manages engineers. By the time you notice the pattern, new hires have already been taught that "this is just how we do things here." The corruption reproduces itself through onboarding.
> Fear is induced by coercion, the threat of negative consequences such as
ostracism and demotion. To be sure, blatant coercion facilitates the denial of
responsibility and thereby compliance with corrupt directives. Such coercion,
however, leaves less room for (perceived) volition, a key precondition for the
dissonance reduction process discussed earlier. Newcomers subject to blatant
coercion have a sufficient justification for their obedience – to avoid the threat –
and thus do not need to realign their attitudes to accommodate the otherwise dissonant behavior. Indeed, blatant coercion may provoke resentment and reactance
against the source of coercion and the targeted behavior (e.g. Nail, Van Leeuwen
& Powell, 1996). The upshot is a greater likelihood of grudging compliance,
whistle-blowing and voluntary turnover (and thus, risk of exposure). Further,
coercion may affect behavior only as long as the pressure is applied. For these
reasons, blatant coercion tends to be an ineffective means of sustaining corruption.
Astute. When the average person is asked to imagine how corrupt leaders operate, I think they tend to overemphasize the effectiveness of simple violence. To foster a corruption that will last, you have to mold the circumstances so that corruption is the only option that makes sense.
Very insightful on how this corruption develops:
"How can a group hold a worldview so at odds with the wider culture and not appear to be greatly conflicted by it? The answer may lie in the distinction between particularism and universalism. An individual develops social identities specific to the social domains, groups and roles – and accompanying subcultures – that he or she occupies (e.g. manager, mother, parishioner, sports fan). [...]
In the case of corruption, this myopia means that an otherwise ethically-minded individual may forsake universalistic or dominant norms about ethical behavior in favor of particularistic behaviors that favor his or her group at the expense of outsiders. [...]
This tendency to always put the ingroup above all others clearly paves the way for collective corruption."
The situation in which people exchange favors within their mutually beneficial personal networks seems to be the basic and typical way things function. It’s actually remarkable that we are able to resist this tendency and normalize fair and impartial institutions.
The author cites Arendt a fair bit, whose claim to fame was that entirely ordinary people could become voluntary instruments of atrocity.
I think the belief of ordinary people most likely to dispose them to atrocity is that of prioritizing the ingroup. Once we believe that the members of one's own family, or company, or country, carry more moral value than others, we're doomed to a descent limited only by our ability to make these world-worsening trades.
When I was a child, my dad would sometimes engage in small acts of corruption to please me or my brother. Taking somebody else's spot, telling white lies to get more than his share of a rationed good, that sort of thing. It never sat right with me. "Family first" has a very ominous ring to me.
The brain actually has specific neurological system that compartmentalise reasoning contexts in different social contexts, so we operate according to different sets of assumptions and rules of behaviour and reasoning in different kinds of situations.
It’s like they worked at my last workplace
The US supreme court allowed thank you gifts for politicians to not be considered bribes somehow in a 2024 ruling, I think that alone might break the US.
lest we forget luxury fishing trips, RVs, real-estate debt payoffs, or payoffs of relatives' tuition
The particularism vs universalism distinction the paper draws is the mechanism I see play out in engineering orgs all the time. A team develops its own internal logic — "we ship fast, we don't write tests for that, we work around the architecture review" — and within the team that behavior feels rational and even virtuous. It's only corruption relative to the broader organization's stated values.
What makes it hard to fix in tech specifically is that the same behavior that looks like corruption from one angle (circumventing process) looks like execution speed from another. The person who bypasses code review to ship a hotfix is either a hero or a liability depending on who's telling the story.
The paper's point about normalization through socialization is the part that should concern anyone who manages engineers. By the time you notice the pattern, new hires have already been taught that "this is just how we do things here." The corruption reproduces itself through onboarding.
> Fear is induced by coercion, the threat of negative consequences such as ostracism and demotion. To be sure, blatant coercion facilitates the denial of responsibility and thereby compliance with corrupt directives. Such coercion, however, leaves less room for (perceived) volition, a key precondition for the dissonance reduction process discussed earlier. Newcomers subject to blatant coercion have a sufficient justification for their obedience – to avoid the threat – and thus do not need to realign their attitudes to accommodate the otherwise dissonant behavior. Indeed, blatant coercion may provoke resentment and reactance against the source of coercion and the targeted behavior (e.g. Nail, Van Leeuwen & Powell, 1996). The upshot is a greater likelihood of grudging compliance, whistle-blowing and voluntary turnover (and thus, risk of exposure). Further, coercion may affect behavior only as long as the pressure is applied. For these reasons, blatant coercion tends to be an ineffective means of sustaining corruption.
Astute. When the average person is asked to imagine how corrupt leaders operate, I think they tend to overemphasize the effectiveness of simple violence. To foster a corruption that will last, you have to mold the circumstances so that corruption is the only option that makes sense.
Such an insightful article. Had to cover in 3 sittings though - the reading is a bit dense.