I would think it's more secure than clientAuth certs because if an attacker gets a misissued cert they'd have to actually execute a MitM attack to use it. In contrast, with a misissued clientAuth cert they can just connect to the server and present it.
Another fun fact: the Mozilla root store, which I'd guess the vast majority of XMPP servers are using as their trust store, has ZERO rules governing clientAuth issuance. CAs are allowed to issue clientAuth-only certificates under a technically-constrained non-TLS sub CA to anyone they want without any validation (as long as the check clears ;-). It has never been secure to accept the clientAuth EKU when using the Mozilla root store.
I like how the article describes how certificates work for both client and server. I know a little bit about it but what I read helps to reinforce what I already know and it taught me something new. I appreciate it when someone takes the time to explain things like this.
Thanks! I didn't intentionally write this for a broader audience (I didn't expect to see it while casually opening HN!). Our user base is quite diverse, so I try to find the balance between being too technical and over-explanatory. Glad it was helpful!
Google has recently imposed a rule that CA roots trusted by Chrome must be used solely for the core server-authentication use case, and can't also be used for other stuff. They laid out the rationale here: https://googlechrome.github.io/chromerootprogram/moving-forw...
It's a little vague, but my understanding reading between the lines is that sometimes, when attempts were made to push through security-enhancing changes to the Web PKI, CAs would push back on the grounds that there'd be collateral damage to non-Web-PKI use cases with different cost-benefit profiles on security vs. availability, and the browser vendors want that to stop happening.
Let's Encrypt could of course continue offering client certificates if they wanted to, but they'd need to set up a separate root for those certificates to chain up to, and they don't think there's enough demand for that to be worth it.
>when attempts were made to push through security-enhancing changes to the Web PKI, CAs would push back on the grounds that there'd be collateral damage to non-Web-PKI use cases
Do you (or anyone else) have an example of this happening?
After the WebPKI banned the issuance of new SHA-1 certificates due to the risk of collisions, several major payment processors (Worldpay[1], First Data[2], TSYS[3]) demanded to get more SHA-1 certificates because their customers had credit card terminals that did not support SHA-2 certificates.
They launched a gross pressure campaign, trotting out "small businesses" and charity events that would lose money unless SHA-1 certificates were allowed. Of course, these payment processors did billions in revenue per year and had years to ship out new credit card terminals. And small organizations could have and would have just gotten a $10 Square reader at the nearest UPS store if their credit card terminals stopped working, which is what the legacy payment processors were truly scared of.
The pressure was so strong that the browser vendors ended up allowing Symantec to intentionally violate the Baseline Requirements and issue SHA-1 certificates to these payment processors. Ever since, there has been a very strong desire to get use cases like this out of the WebPKI and onto private PKI where they belong.
A clientAuth EKU is the strongest indicator possible that a certificate is not intended for use by browsers, so allowing them is entirely downside for browser users. I feel bad for the clientAuth use cases where a public PKI is useful and which aren't causing any trouble (such as XMPP) but this is ultimately a very tiny use case, and a world where browsers prioritize the security of ordinary Web users is much better than the bad old days when the business interests of CAs and their large enterprise customers dominated.
This sounds a lot like the "increasing hostility for non-web usecases" line in the OP.
In theory, Chrome's rule would split the CA system into a "for web browsers" half and a "for everything else" half - but in practice, there might not be a lot of resources to keep the latter half operational.
It is really great how they write "TLS use cases" and in fact mean HTTPS use cases.
CA/Browser Forum has disallowed the issuance of server certificates that make use of the SRVName [0] subjectAltName type, which obviously _was_ a server use case, and I guess the only reason why we still are allowed to use the Web PKI for SMTP is that both operate on the server hostname and it's not technically possible to limit the protocol.
It would be perfectly fine to let CAs issue certificates for non-Web use-cases with a different set of requirements, without the hassle of maintaining and distributing multiple Roots, but CA/BF deliberately chose not to.
I’m disappointed that a competitor doesn’t exist that uses longevity of IP routing as a reputation validator. I would think maintaining routing of DNS to a static IP is a better metric for reputation. Having unstable infrastructure to me is a flag for fly by night operations.
I wonder if this is a potential "off switch" for the internet. Just hit the root ca so they can't hand out the renewed certificates, you only have to push them over for a week or so.
People will learn to press all the buttons with scarry messages to ignore the wrong certificates. It may be a problem for credit cards and online shopping.
Based on previous history where people actually did call google's bluff to their regret, what happens is that google trusts all current certificates and just stops trusting new certs as they are issued.
Google has dragged PKI security into the 21st century kicking and screaming. Their reforms are the reason why PKI security is not a joke anymore. They are definitely not afraid to call CA companies bluff. They will win.
Not forbidden, just not going to be a part of WebPKI.
It's one of those things that has just piggybacked on top of WebPKI and things just piggybacking is a bad idea. There have been multiple cases in the past where this has caused a lot of pain for making meaningful improvements (some of those have been mentioned elsewhere in this thread).
The real takeaway is that there's never been a lot of real thought put into supporting client authentication - e.g. there's no root CA program for client certificates. To use a term from that discussion, it's usually just "piggybacked" on server authentication.
There might be some confusion here, as there is no refusal at all.
As stated in the blog post, we (Prosody) have been accepting (only) serverAuth certificates for a long time. However this is technically in violation of the relevant RFCs, and not the default behaviour of TLS libraries, so it's far from natural for software to be implementing this.
There was only one implementation discovered so far which was not accepting certificates unless they included the clientAuth purpose, and that was already updated 6+ months ago.
This blog post is intended to alert our users, and the broader XMPP community, about the issue that many were unaware of, and particularly to nudge server operators to upgrade their software if necessary, to avoid any federation issues on the network.
The article literally talks about how one of the server implementations does exactly that:
> Does this affect Prosody?
> Not directly. Let’s Encrypt is not the first CA to issue server-only certificates. Many years ago, we incorporated changes into Prosody which allow server-only certificates to be used for server-to-server connections, regardless of which server started the connection. [...]
XMPP identifiers have domain names, so the XMPP server can check that the DNS SAN matches the domain name of the identifiers in incoming XMPP messages.
I've seen non-XMPP systems where you configure the DNS name to require in the client certificate.
It's possible to do this securely, but I agree entirely with your other comment that using a public PKI with client certs is a recipe for disaster because it's so easy and common to screw up.
Client authentication with publicly-trusted (i.e. chaining to roots in one of the major 4 or 5 trust-store programs) is bad. It doesn't actually authenticate anything at all, and never has.
No-one that uses it is authenticating anything more than the other party has an internet connection and the ability, perhaps, to read.
No part of the Subject DN or SAN is checked. It's just that it's 'easy' to rely on an existing trust-store rather than implement something secure using private PKI.
Some providers who 'require' public TLS certs for mTLS even specify specific products and CAs (OV, EV from specific CAs) not realising that both the CAs and the roots are going to rotate more frequently in future.
A client cert can be stored, so it provides at least a little bit of identification certainty. It's very hard to steal or impersonate a specific client cert, so the site has a high likelihood of knowing you're the same person you were when you connected before (even though the initial connection may very well not have ID'd the correct person!). That has value.
But it also doesn't involve any particular trust in the CA either. Lets Encrypt has nothing to offer here so there's no reason for them to try to make promises.
Point being that if you get a valid TLS connection from a client cert, and then you get another valid connection from the same cert tomorrow, you can be very certain that the entity connecting is either the same software environment that connected earlier, or an attacker that has compromised it. You can be cryptographically certain that it is not an attacker that hasn't effected a full compromise of your client.
And there's value there, if you're a server. It's why XMPP wants federated servers to authenticate themselves with certificates in the first place.
I feel like using web pki for client authentication doesn't really make sense in the first place. How do you verify the common name/subject alt name actually matches when using a client cert.
Using web pki for client certs seems like a recipe for disaster. Where servers would just verify they are signed but since anyone can sign then anyone can spoof.
And this isn't just hypothetical. I remember xmlsec (a library for validating xml signature, primarily saml) used to use web pki for signature validation in addition to specified cert, which resulted in lot SAML bypasses where you could pass validation by signing the SAML response with any certificate from lets encrypt including the attackers.
A public CA checks it one-time, when it's being issued.
Most/all mTLS use-cases don't do any checking of the client cert in any capacity. Worse still, some APIs (mainly for finance companies) require things like OV and EV, but of course they couldn't check the Subject DN if they wanted to.
If it's for auth, issue it yourself and don't rely on a third-party like a public CA.
A federated ecosystem of servers that need to verify each other based on their domain name as the identity is the prime use-case for a public CA to issue domain-verified client certificates. XMPP happens to be this ecosystem.
Rolling out a private PKI for XMPP, with a dedicated Root CA, would be a significant effort, essentially redoing all the hard work of LetsEncrypt, but without the major funding, thus ending up with an insecure solution.
We make use of the public CAs, that have been issuing TLS certificates based on domain validation, for quite a few years now, before the public TLS CAs have been subverted to become public HTTPS-only CAs by Google and the CA/Browser Forum.
Yes, this is what is happening. It isn't happening fast enough, so some implementations (especially servers that don't upgrade often enough, or running long-term-support OS flavors) will still be affected. This is the impact that the original article is warning about.
My point was that this is yet another change that makes TLS operations harder for non-Web use cases, with the "benefit" to the WebPKI being the removal of a hypothetical complexity, motivated by examples that indeed should have used a private PKI in the first place.
That's exactly what prosody is doing, but it's a weird solution. Essentially, they're just ignoring the missing EKU flag and pretend it would be there, violating the spec.
It seems weird to first remove the flag and then tell everyone to update their servers to ignore the removal. Then why remove it in the first place?
> A public CA checks it one-time, when it's being issued.
That's the same problem we have with server certs, and the general solution seems to be "shorter cert lifetimes".
> Worse still, some APIs (mainly for finance companies) require things like OV and EV, but of course they couldn't check the Subject DN if they wanted to.
Not an expert there, but isn't the point of EV that the CA verified the "real life entity" that requested the cert? So then it depends on what kind of access model the finance company was specifying for its API. "I don't care who is using my API as long as they are a company" is indeed a very stupid access model, but then I think the problem is deeper than just cert validation.
You are correct, and the answer is - no-one using publicly-trusted TLS certs for client authentication is actually doing any authentication. At best, they're verifying the other party has an internet connection and perhaps the ability to read.
It was only ever used because other options are harder to implement.
It seems reasonable for server-to-server auth though? Suppose my server xmpp.foo.com already trusts the other server xmpp.bar.com. Now I get some random incoming connection. How would I verify that this connection indeed originates from xmpp.bar.com? LE-assigned client certs sound like a good solution to that problem.
This post here is the demonstration, that some non-WebPKI purpose is causing issues and complaints. This has happened before with SHA-1 deprecation. WebPKI does not want this burden and should not have this burden.
Is there any reason why things gravitate towards being web-centric, especially Google-centric?
Seeing that Google's browser policies triggered the LE change and the fact that most CAs are really just focusing on what websites need rather than non-web services isn't helpful considering that browsers now are terribly inefficient (I mean come on, 1GB of RAM for 3 tabs of Firefox whilst still buffering?!) yet XMPP is significantly more lightweight and yet more featureful compared to say Discord.
"This change is prompted by changes to Google Chrome’s root program requirements, which impose a June 2026 deadline to split TLS Client and Server Authentication into separate PKIs. Many uses of client authentication are better served by a private certificate authority, and so Let’s Encrypt is discontinuing support for TLS Client Authentication ahead of this deadline."
> they just decided it wasn't worth the effort anymore
That seems disingenuous. Doesn't being in the client cert business now require a lot of extra effort that it didn't before, due entirely to Google's new rule?
Is there a reason why dialback isn't the answer?
I would think it's more secure than clientAuth certs because if an attacker gets a misissued cert they'd have to actually execute a MitM attack to use it. In contrast, with a misissued clientAuth cert they can just connect to the server and present it.
Another fun fact: the Mozilla root store, which I'd guess the vast majority of XMPP servers are using as their trust store, has ZERO rules governing clientAuth issuance. CAs are allowed to issue clientAuth-only certificates under a technically-constrained non-TLS sub CA to anyone they want without any validation (as long as the check clears ;-). It has never been secure to accept the clientAuth EKU when using the Mozilla root store.
I like how the article describes how certificates work for both client and server. I know a little bit about it but what I read helps to reinforce what I already know and it taught me something new. I appreciate it when someone takes the time to explain things like this.
Thanks! I didn't intentionally write this for a broader audience (I didn't expect to see it while casually opening HN!). Our user base is quite diverse, so I try to find the balance between being too technical and over-explanatory. Glad it was helpful!
Why did LE make this change? It feels like a rather deliberate attack on the decentralised web.
Google has recently imposed a rule that CA roots trusted by Chrome must be used solely for the core server-authentication use case, and can't also be used for other stuff. They laid out the rationale here: https://googlechrome.github.io/chromerootprogram/moving-forw...
It's a little vague, but my understanding reading between the lines is that sometimes, when attempts were made to push through security-enhancing changes to the Web PKI, CAs would push back on the grounds that there'd be collateral damage to non-Web-PKI use cases with different cost-benefit profiles on security vs. availability, and the browser vendors want that to stop happening.
Let's Encrypt could of course continue offering client certificates if they wanted to, but they'd need to set up a separate root for those certificates to chain up to, and they don't think there's enough demand for that to be worth it.
Why can't Let's Encrypt push-back on this for their users' sake? What is Google going to do? distrust LE certs?
>when attempts were made to push through security-enhancing changes to the Web PKI, CAs would push back on the grounds that there'd be collateral damage to non-Web-PKI use cases
Do you (or anyone else) have an example of this happening?
After the WebPKI banned the issuance of new SHA-1 certificates due to the risk of collisions, several major payment processors (Worldpay[1], First Data[2], TSYS[3]) demanded to get more SHA-1 certificates because their customers had credit card terminals that did not support SHA-2 certificates.
They launched a gross pressure campaign, trotting out "small businesses" and charity events that would lose money unless SHA-1 certificates were allowed. Of course, these payment processors did billions in revenue per year and had years to ship out new credit card terminals. And small organizations could have and would have just gotten a $10 Square reader at the nearest UPS store if their credit card terminals stopped working, which is what the legacy payment processors were truly scared of.
The pressure was so strong that the browser vendors ended up allowing Symantec to intentionally violate the Baseline Requirements and issue SHA-1 certificates to these payment processors. Ever since, there has been a very strong desire to get use cases like this out of the WebPKI and onto private PKI where they belong.
A clientAuth EKU is the strongest indicator possible that a certificate is not intended for use by browsers, so allowing them is entirely downside for browser users. I feel bad for the clientAuth use cases where a public PKI is useful and which aren't causing any trouble (such as XMPP) but this is ultimately a very tiny use case, and a world where browsers prioritize the security of ordinary Web users is much better than the bad old days when the business interests of CAs and their large enterprise customers dominated.
[1] https://groups.google.com/g/mozilla.dev.security.policy/c/RH...
[2] https://groups.google.com/g/mozilla.dev.security.policy/c/yh...
[3] https://groups.google.com/g/mozilla.dev.security.policy/c/LM...
This sounds a lot like the "increasing hostility for non-web usecases" line in the OP.
In theory, Chrome's rule would split the CA system into a "for web browsers" half and a "for everything else" half - but in practice, there might not be a lot of resources to keep the latter half operational.
It is really great how they write "TLS use cases" and in fact mean HTTPS use cases.
CA/Browser Forum has disallowed the issuance of server certificates that make use of the SRVName [0] subjectAltName type, which obviously _was_ a server use case, and I guess the only reason why we still are allowed to use the Web PKI for SMTP is that both operate on the server hostname and it's not technically possible to limit the protocol.
It would be perfectly fine to let CAs issue certificates for non-Web use-cases with a different set of requirements, without the hassle of maintaining and distributing multiple Roots, but CA/BF deliberately chose not to.
[0] https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/srvname-and-xmppaddr-sup...
I’m disappointed that a competitor doesn’t exist that uses longevity of IP routing as a reputation validator. I would think maintaining routing of DNS to a static IP is a better metric for reputation. Having unstable infrastructure to me is a flag for fly by night operations.
Well, be prepared for certificates that change every 7 to 47 days, as the Internet formally moves to security being built entirely on sand.
I wonder if this is a potential "off switch" for the internet. Just hit the root ca so they can't hand out the renewed certificates, you only have to push them over for a week or so.
People will learn to press all the buttons with scarry messages to ignore the wrong certificates. It may be a problem for credit cards and online shopping.
Isn't LE used for half the web at this point?
Calling Google's bluff and seeing if they would willingly cut their users off from half the web seems like an option here.
That's not how this would work.
Based on previous history where people actually did call google's bluff to their regret, what happens is that google trusts all current certificates and just stops trusting new certs as they are issued.
Google has dragged PKI security into the 21st century kicking and screaming. Their reforms are the reason why PKI security is not a joke anymore. They are definitely not afraid to call CA companies bluff. They will win.
How is "client certificates forbidden" in any way an improvement?
Not forbidden, just not going to be a part of WebPKI.
It's one of those things that has just piggybacked on top of WebPKI and things just piggybacking is a bad idea. There have been multiple cases in the past where this has caused a lot of pain for making meaningful improvements (some of those have been mentioned elsewhere in this thread).
What exactly do you mean with "WebPKI"?
The PKI system was designed independently of the web and the web used to be one usecase of it. You're kind of turning that around here.
Not precisely an answer, but there's some related discussion here:
https://cabforum.org/2025/06/11/minutes-of-the-f2f-65-meetin...
The real takeaway is that there's never been a lot of real thought put into supporting client authentication - e.g. there's no root CA program for client certificates. To use a term from that discussion, it's usually just "piggybacked" on server authentication.
No, it feels like the standard 'group/engineer/PM' didn't think anyone did anything different from their own implementation.
Lets Encrypt is just used for like, webservers right, why do this other stuff webservers never use.
Which does appear to be the thinking, though they blame Google, which also seems to have taken the 'webservers in general don't do this, it's not important' - https://letsencrypt.org/2025/05/14/ending-tls-client-authent...
Google forced separate client and server PKIs.[1]
[1] https://letsencrypt.org/2025/05/14/ending-tls-client-authent...
Shame LE didn't give people option to generate client and client+server auth certs
Yes, but then the lack of pragmatism shown by the XMPP community is a bit disconcerting
What is the lack of pragmatism you are talking about?
The refusal to accept server only certificate as client certificate for server
There might be some confusion here, as there is no refusal at all.
As stated in the blog post, we (Prosody) have been accepting (only) serverAuth certificates for a long time. However this is technically in violation of the relevant RFCs, and not the default behaviour of TLS libraries, so it's far from natural for software to be implementing this.
There was only one implementation discovered so far which was not accepting certificates unless they included the clientAuth purpose, and that was already updated 6+ months ago.
This blog post is intended to alert our users, and the broader XMPP community, about the issue that many were unaware of, and particularly to nudge server operators to upgrade their software if necessary, to avoid any federation issues on the network.
The article literally talks about how one of the server implementations does exactly that:
> Does this affect Prosody?
> Not directly. Let’s Encrypt is not the first CA to issue server-only certificates. Many years ago, we incorporated changes into Prosody which allow server-only certificates to be used for server-to-server connections, regardless of which server started the connection. [...]
It is not pragmatic to design your protocol for web use cases when it's not the web.
Unless im missing something, this is a poor design full stop. How are they validating SAN on these client certificates?
XMPP identifiers have domain names, so the XMPP server can check that the DNS SAN matches the domain name of the identifiers in incoming XMPP messages.
I've seen non-XMPP systems where you configure the DNS name to require in the client certificate.
It's possible to do this securely, but I agree entirely with your other comment that using a public PKI with client certs is a recipe for disaster because it's so easy and common to screw up.
For those wondering if ejabberd Debian systems will be impacted, it seems like for now there no fix, the issue is being tracked here: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1127369
Code can just ignore the EKU, if it's already using the certificate in an odd way.
Client authentication with publicly-trusted (i.e. chaining to roots in one of the major 4 or 5 trust-store programs) is bad. It doesn't actually authenticate anything at all, and never has.
No-one that uses it is authenticating anything more than the other party has an internet connection and the ability, perhaps, to read. No part of the Subject DN or SAN is checked. It's just that it's 'easy' to rely on an existing trust-store rather than implement something secure using private PKI.
Some providers who 'require' public TLS certs for mTLS even specify specific products and CAs (OV, EV from specific CAs) not realising that both the CAs and the roots are going to rotate more frequently in future.
A client cert can be stored, so it provides at least a little bit of identification certainty. It's very hard to steal or impersonate a specific client cert, so the site has a high likelihood of knowing you're the same person you were when you connected before (even though the initial connection may very well not have ID'd the correct person!). That has value.
But it also doesn't involve any particular trust in the CA either. Lets Encrypt has nothing to offer here so there's no reason for them to try to make promises.
Eh, it's pretty easy to impersonate if the values in the certificate aren't checked, and you could get one from any of a list of public CAs.
If you're relying on a certificate for authentication - issue it yourself.
Point being that if you get a valid TLS connection from a client cert, and then you get another valid connection from the same cert tomorrow, you can be very certain that the entity connecting is either the same software environment that connected earlier, or an attacker that has compromised it. You can be cryptographically certain that it is not an attacker that hasn't effected a full compromise of your client.
And there's value there, if you're a server. It's why XMPP wants federated servers to authenticate themselves with certificates in the first place.
I feel like using web pki for client authentication doesn't really make sense in the first place. How do you verify the common name/subject alt name actually matches when using a client cert.
Using web pki for client certs seems like a recipe for disaster. Where servers would just verify they are signed but since anyone can sign then anyone can spoof.
And this isn't just hypothetical. I remember xmlsec (a library for validating xml signature, primarily saml) used to use web pki for signature validation in addition to specified cert, which resulted in lot SAML bypasses where you could pass validation by signing the SAML response with any certificate from lets encrypt including the attackers.
> How do you verify the common name/subject alt name actually matches when using a client cert.
This seems exactly like a reason to use client certs with public CAs.
You (as in, the server) cannot verify this at all, but a public CA could.
A public CA checks it one-time, when it's being issued. Most/all mTLS use-cases don't do any checking of the client cert in any capacity. Worse still, some APIs (mainly for finance companies) require things like OV and EV, but of course they couldn't check the Subject DN if they wanted to.
If it's for auth, issue it yourself and don't rely on a third-party like a public CA.
A federated ecosystem of servers that need to verify each other based on their domain name as the identity is the prime use-case for a public CA to issue domain-verified client certificates. XMPP happens to be this ecosystem.
Rolling out a private PKI for XMPP, with a dedicated Root CA, would be a significant effort, essentially redoing all the hard work of LetsEncrypt, but without the major funding, thus ending up with an insecure solution.
We make use of the public CAs, that have been issuing TLS certificates based on domain validation, for quite a few years now, before the public TLS CAs have been subverted to become public HTTPS-only CAs by Google and the CA/Browser Forum.
> Rolling out a private PKI for XMPP, with a dedicated Root CA, would be a significant effort
Rolling out a change that removes the EKU check would not be that much effort however.
Yes, this is what is happening. It isn't happening fast enough, so some implementations (especially servers that don't upgrade often enough, or running long-term-support OS flavors) will still be affected. This is the impact that the original article is warning about.
My point was that this is yet another change that makes TLS operations harder for non-Web use cases, with the "benefit" to the WebPKI being the removal of a hypothetical complexity, motivated by examples that indeed should have used a private PKI in the first place.
That's exactly what prosody is doing, but it's a weird solution. Essentially, they're just ignoring the missing EKU flag and pretend it would be there, violating the spec.
It seems weird to first remove the flag and then tell everyone to update their servers to ignore the removal. Then why remove it in the first place?
> A public CA checks it one-time, when it's being issued.
That's the same problem we have with server certs, and the general solution seems to be "shorter cert lifetimes".
> Worse still, some APIs (mainly for finance companies) require things like OV and EV, but of course they couldn't check the Subject DN if they wanted to.
Not an expert there, but isn't the point of EV that the CA verified the "real life entity" that requested the cert? So then it depends on what kind of access model the finance company was specifying for its API. "I don't care who is using my API as long as they are a company" is indeed a very stupid access model, but then I think the problem is deeper than just cert validation.
You are correct, and the answer is - no-one using publicly-trusted TLS certs for client authentication is actually doing any authentication. At best, they're verifying the other party has an internet connection and perhaps the ability to read.
It was only ever used because other options are harder to implement.
It seems reasonable for server-to-server auth though? Suppose my server xmpp.foo.com already trusts the other server xmpp.bar.com. Now I get some random incoming connection. How would I verify that this connection indeed originates from xmpp.bar.com? LE-assigned client certs sound like a good solution to that problem.
Which is almost exactly why WebPKI doesn't want to support such use-cases. Just this EKU change alone demonstrates how it can hinder WebPKI changes.
Can you point out, at which point in time exactly, the public TLS PKI infrastructure has been reduced to WebPKI?
Can you point out at which point in time exactly it was designed to serve every use-case?
Huh? The entire purpose of that EKU change was to disallow that usecase. How did that demonstrate problems for WebPKI?
This post here is the demonstration, that some non-WebPKI purpose is causing issues and complaints. This has happened before with SHA-1 deprecation. WebPKI does not want this burden and should not have this burden.
Ok, so this is an official split of "WebPKI" and "everything else PKI" then?
Last time I checked, Let's Encrypt was saying they provide free TLS certs, not free WebPKI certs. When did that change?
Is there any reason why things gravitate towards being web-centric, especially Google-centric? Seeing that Google's browser policies triggered the LE change and the fact that most CAs are really just focusing on what websites need rather than non-web services isn't helpful considering that browsers now are terribly inefficient (I mean come on, 1GB of RAM for 3 tabs of Firefox whilst still buffering?!) yet XMPP is significantly more lightweight and yet more featureful compared to say Discord.
> Is there any reason why things gravitate towards being web-centric, especially Google-centric?
Yes, the reason is called "Chrome" and "90% market share"...
From https://letsencrypt.org/2025/05/14/ending-tls-client-authent...
"This change is prompted by changes to Google Chrome’s root program requirements, which impose a June 2026 deadline to split TLS Client and Server Authentication into separate PKIs. Many uses of client authentication are better served by a private certificate authority, and so Let’s Encrypt is discontinuing support for TLS Client Authentication ahead of this deadline."
TL;DR blame Google
Google didn't force lets encrypt to totally get out of the client cert business, they just decided it wasn't worth the effort anymore.
Publicly-trusted client authentication does nothing. It's not a thing that should exist, or is needed.
Feel free to start your own non-profit to issue client certs signed by a public authority.
As LE says, most users of client certs are doing mtls and so self-signed is fine.
> they just decided it wasn't worth the effort anymore
That seems disingenuous. Doesn't being in the client cert business now require a lot of extra effort that it didn't before, due entirely to Google's new rule?
No, not really. Unless you consider basic accountability "extra effort".